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EMERGENCY MEGA-PROJECT CASE STUDY PROTEST: THE I-35W 1 
BRIDGE  2 
 3 
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 6 
ABSTRACT 7 
When a disaster destroys a vital piece of infrastructure, like an interstate highway or a large bridge, 8 
the procurement must be developed in a manner that expedites the restoration of services with the 9 
shortest schedule practical. Expediting an emergency restoration of services project event makes 10 
the selection of the appropriate procurement procedure complicated by the need to emphasize 11 
schedule over cost and quality. The need to waive or limit statutory rules for open competition 12 
increases the risk of protests. This paper presents the results of the case study of the emergency 13 
restoration of services award protest for the Interstate Highway 35 West in Minneapolis, 14 
Minnesota. The paper concludes that the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) 15 
successfully defended itself against an award protest because it published the details of the 16 
project’s proposal evaluation plan, making it transparent and strictly followed it throughout the 17 
procurement and award process. 18 
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INTRODUCTION  30 
One major legal issue in emergency procurements is the need to waive or limit statutory rules for 31 
open competition to expedite the contract award (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012). A delay in the 32 
start of emergency restoration construction created by a protest of the award is potentially 33 
devastating. This paper will discuss the details of that specific issue by presenting the case study 34 
of the emergency restoration of services for the Interstate Highway 35 West (I-35W) bridge over 35 
the Mississippi River in Minneapolis below the Saint Anthony Falls Lock and Dam. A stream-36 
lined best value selection process was developed by the Minnesota Department of Transportation 37 
(MnDOT) to expedite the award of a design-build (DB) contract to replace the collapsed structure 38 
(Warne 2008). The contract was not awarded to the lowest priced proposal, forcing MnDOT to 39 
defend a protest of the award by the low bidder in court (Hietpas 2008). MnDOT was successful 40 
largely due to past DB award protest experience, which led to the agency strictly disciplining the 41 
proposal evaluation process in a manner that contributed to a logical defense of the award decision 42 
(Shane et al. 2006).  43 
 44 
When a disaster destroys a vital piece of infrastructure, like an interstate highway or a large bridge, 45 
the procurement must be developed in a manner that expedites the restoration of services with the 46 
shortest schedule practical. Here an emergency services restoration project is defined as “a project 47 
initiated as the result of some unexpected circumstance that negatively affected or completely 48 
diminished the capacity and/or level of service of a given transportation facility (road, bridge, 49 
tunnel, etc.) to the point where the impact is great enough to warrant special treatment in the 50 
procurement phase” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012). Procurement is defined as “the combined 51 
functions of purchasing, inventory control, traffic and transportation, receiving, inspection, store 52 
keeping, and salvage and disposal operations” (State of Minnesota 2011).  53 
 54 
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Emergency procurement procedures are necessary because “during a construction crisis, 55 
traditional contracts are inflexible, restrictive and counter-productive” (Loosemore and Hughes 56 
1998). For example, the 2009 and 2010 earthquakes that devastated Christchurch, New Zealand, 57 
forced the New Zealand Transport Agency to invent a new project delivery method called 58 
“collaborative alliancing” (Gransberg and Scheepbouwer 2014).  The earthquakes in Christchurch 59 
caused major damage to the horizontal infrastructure across the city. Both the central and local 60 
governments considered the challenges posed by the scale of the damage significant, and it was 61 
determined that a purpose-built organization was required for the rebuild (Hurley 2013; 62 
LeMasurier 2015). The situation asked for a new level of collaboration which posed several unique 63 
features. First, the size of the disaster meant that it was too big to handle for any one company. 64 
Secondly, with the political/media coverage expected, the risk was too great for a single company. 65 
And thirdly, there was a need and political and social pressure to start work immediately, before 66 
the scope was entirely clear or defined. By forming a collaborative alliance that included multiple 67 
construction companies, engineering consulting firms, and members of involved each 68 
governmental entity with jurisdiction in the disaster area, the necessary resources were made 69 
immediately available and in a form that permitted both quick and efficient employment (Botha 70 
and Scheepbouwer 2015). 71 
 72 
Expediting an emergency restoration of services project makes the selection of the appropriate 73 
procurement procedure complicated. Time is of the essence, requiring agencies to give schedule 74 
priority over quality and cost until the disrupted service has been restored (Houston 2011). 75 
Awarding an emergency contract is made more problematic by the high level of emotions and 76 
media coverage that surrounds most emergencies. Each project delivery methods utilitzes a unique 77 
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standard contract forms, which is then tailored to match the project’s characteristics. “Emergency 78 
projects, because of their urgent nature, lend themselves well to time-based innovative bidding 79 
techniques” (PennDOT 2011). 80 
 81 
To expedite the replacement of a major transportation asset under emergency conditions often 82 
requires specific authorization to waive the many procurement rules, permitting gates, and 83 
sometimes restrictive contracting policies in a highly compressed period of time to restore lost 84 
services (Gransberg 2013). Many public transportation agencies anticipate the need to rapidly react 85 
to infrastructure emergencies and have expended significant resources on emergency management 86 
plans that include a set of accelerated purchasing procedures (Perry and Hines 2007; Blakemore 87 
and Konda 2010; Houston 2011). Routine procurements are rigorously regulated by both state and 88 
federal legislation. Most state DOTs must obey both laws and regulations meant to ensure 89 
maximum competition between interested contractors (Perry and Hines 2007). To deviate from 90 
completely open competition runs the risk that an award protest will be lodged, delaying the swift 91 
restoration of services (Bai et al. 2006). Issues ranging from public relations problems created by 92 
unwanted media attention to a formal protest of award and subsequent litigation, all carry the threat 93 
of delay to the restoration of service.  94 
Background 95 
The Interstate Highway 35 West (I-35W) bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, 96 
Minnesota collapsed without warning on the evening of August 1, 2007, killing 13 travelers and 97 
injuring many occupants of the 111 vehicles that were transiting the bridge when it failed. In 98 
addition, it also closed the navigation channel below the St. Anthony Falls lock on the Mississippi 99 
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and of course removed 8 lanes of capacity from an urban freeway with an average daily traffic of 100 
140,000 vehicles per day.  101 
 102 
The I-35W bridge was originally erected in 1967 and consisted of a steel structure that incorporated 103 
welded built-up steel beams for girders and truss members, with riveted and bolted connections 104 
(NTSB 2008). The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that “the probable 105 
cause of the collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, was the inadequate load 106 
capacity, due to a design error…” (NTSB 2008). While there has been much written about the 107 
engineering issues that may have led to the collapse, this paper will focus only on the procurement 108 
issues that led to the eventual protest. 109 
 110 
Immediately after the collapse, the wheels were set in motion to remove the wreckage from the 111 
river, restore the navigation channel and replace the structure, reopening it to traffic as soon as 112 
practical. MnDOT is an agency which implemented DB contracting in 1996, obtaining the 113 
necessary enabling legislation to use best value award in 2001 (MnDOT 2008). According to 114 
Warne (2008), “MnDOT’s extensive experience with design-build played an important role in its 115 
ability to advance the St. Anthony Falls [I-35W] Bridge so quickly through the procurement 116 
process”. MnDOT’s specifications contained templates that greatly expedited the development of 117 
contract documents and furnished a “framework for the contractor’s quality management plans … 118 
established minimum expectations and provided an outline for the entire [quality management 119 
plan] ultimately developed by the contractor” (Warne 2008). 120 
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METHODOLOGY 121 
Case study research is appropriate when the researcher requires an in-depth look at alternative 122 
business processes (Eisenhardt 1991). Kohn (1997) proposes that case studies are best used “to 123 
describe a process or the effects of an event… especially when such events affect many different 124 
parties.” The expedited award of a DB mega-project under emergency circumstances qualifies 125 
under both authors’ propositions. Case studies are also quite useful for discovering the answers to 126 
questions on the details and how circumstances influenced key decisions concerning the outcome 127 
of the specific case (Yin 2009; Kohn 1997). As such, the use of case study research was essential 128 
to capture the rationale behind the process that MnDOT developed to procure design and 129 
construction of the I-35W Bridge, as well as the effect of those details that were cited in the 130 
eventual protest.  131 
 132 
The details of interest were collected via a structured interview protocol containing yes/no 133 
questions, checklists and open ended questions. The interview questions were developed using the 134 
process proposed by Oppenheim (1992) and coupled with a structured interview protocol adapted 135 
from the one used by the Government Accountability Office (GAO 1991). The protocol focused 136 
specifically on the capture of causal relationships that were unique to the emergency contract 137 
award process. Interviewees were sent the case study report after the interviews to verify the 138 
accuracy of the report’s information. The case study interview details were also augmented when 139 
appropriate from information found both in the I-35W documentation and the literature. 140 
 141 
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Interviews were conducted with Tom Ravn, PE, MnDOT’s Director of Construction, Jay Hietpas, 142 
PE, MnDOT’s Director of Innovative Contracting and Amber Blanchard, PE, of the MnDOT 143 
Bridge Office, who coordinated the design aspects of the procurement. The interview output from 144 
both MnDOT engineers is incorporated in the details contained in subsequent sections of the paper 145 
and  are collectively cited as “MnDOT” when details from the interviews are provided.    146 
 147 
THE PROCUREMENT DETAILS 148 
According to Perry and Hines (2007), “In both federal and state law, the use of emergency 149 
procurement procedures allows for limiting competition in selecting a contractor.” They go on to 150 
provide this cautionary admonition: “however, this limitation must be carefully utilized and fully 151 
documented.” Expediting the delivery of the I-35W emergency bridge replacement project 152 
includes all the facets of emergency procurement procedures of a complex mega-project in a 153 
heavily urbanized location (Shane et al. 2015). The emergency procurement process developed by 154 
MnDOT was challenged by an award protest. MnDOT was ultimately successful in its defense.  155 
 156 
Stream-lined Design-Build Process 157 
The DB contract to rebuild the bridge was valued at $234 million not including Right-of-Way, etc. 158 
It contained major incentives and disincentives to encourage minimizing of construction time 159 
(Hietpas 2008). The maximum amount of potential time bonuses was set at $27 million, of which 160 
the design-builder eventually was awarded a total of $25 million (Warne 2008). A project-specific 161 
risk management system was designed. The agency and the design-builder collaborated on the 162 
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assembly of a risk register and allocated each risk to the party that could best handle it. For 163 
example, the removal of contaminated soils encountered was assigned to the design-builder who 164 
then delivered them to MnDOT for disposal. Approaching risks in this manner enabled a shorter 165 
procurement period by eliminating the need to complete a thorough subsurface investigation in 166 
order to quantify the scope of contaminated soil processing. MnDOT also abbreviated the short-167 
listing process by limiting the Statement of Qualifications to only key information about the 168 
proposed team members, which in turn reduced the level of effort necessary for competitors to 169 
responsively submit their statements of qualifications for consideration to make the short-list. 170 
 171 
MnDOT requested a “Categorical Exclusion” for the approval factors that were outside the 172 
agency’s control in order to receive federal funding. “Categorical exclusion means a category of 173 
actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human 174 
environment…and…for which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an 175 
environmental impact statement is required” (FHWA, n.d.). This forced MnDOT to tightly control 176 
the final scope and guarantee that any betterments would not violate the exclusion agreement. For 177 
instance, MnDOT decided that it would not entertain proposed design alternatives that required 178 
substantial work on the undamaged interchanges on both ends of the bridge since that might defeat 179 
the ability to obtain a much needed Categorical Exclusion from FHWA (Warne 2008). Since 180 
betterments typically require additional funding, they are ineligible under the provisions of the 181 
federal emergency relief funding program, which might further complicate the issue increasing the 182 
potential of delays (MnDOT 2008). Table 1 shows the scope of the bridge replacement. 183 
Table 1. I-35 W New Bridge Characteristics (MnDOT, n.d.)  184 
Bridge Length 372.27 meters
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Center River Span Length 159.71 meters
Bridge Deck Width 57.61 meters
Lanes 5 lanes of traffic running each direction
Life Span 100 years
Transit Light Rail Transport-ready
 185 
 186 
Right-of-Way 187 
The new bridge needed 3 complete and 10 partial real estate acquisitions. MnDOT executed an 188 
expedited two-step process design to obtain expedited access to required parcels and preclude 189 
potential right-of-way (ROW) process delays (Warne 2008). The process involved obtaining an 190 
early “Right of Entry” easement from each landowner for a nominal payment of $1,000, after 191 
which, MnDOT guaranteed a specific time line to each property owner for concluding the financial 192 
part of each acquisition. The two-step procedure provided MnDOT the ability to occupy specific 193 
parcels to begin both demolition and reconstruction. The process was made easier by the fact that 194 
the owners of those parcels were “generally more cooperative [than usual] given the nature of the 195 
work and the emotional impact on the community of the failure of the 35W Bridge” (Warne 2008). 196 
 197 
Permitting 198 
Ten permits plus an emergency environmental impact analysis were required before reconstruction 199 
could begin. The permitting process was driven by the following philosophy: “Build the largest 200 
project possible with the smallest environmental process” (MnDOT 2008). NCHRP Synthesis 438 201 
(2012) found that the following procedures were implemented to obtain the necessary permits as 202 
quickly as practical: 203 
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• “Held a permitting kickoff meeting with the heads of local, state, and federal permitting 204 
authorities to ‘ensure buy-in from the top down’. The meeting resulted in agreements or 205 
understanding on permitting approvals, mitigation expectations, and submittal requirements, 206 
barriers to overcome, and a single point of contact with decision-making authority in each 207 
agency.”  208 
• “Obtained an agreement from the resource agencies to ensure that each document was 209 
immediately reviewed and comments were returned in a very timely manner.” 210 
• “Delegated the authority to make project scope and design decisions to the individuals who 211 
managed the project and prepared the permit applications.” 212 
• “Took full advantage of existing programmatic agreements and categorical exclusions, 213 
wherever appropriate.” 214 
• “Ensured that any capacity additions were for less than the mandated 1.0 mile in length to 215 
avoid the requirement for an Environmental Assessment which is triggered at that length.” 216 
• “Convened a meeting with the competing proposers and the affected utility companies during 217 
the procurement phase to furnish firsthand information on potential utility relocations rather 218 
than rely on the request for information process.” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012). 219 
 220 
DB Project Delivery Selection Rationale 221 
The MnDOT decision to use DB project delivery for the I-35W replacement bridge was made 222 
based on the agency’s extensive DB experience and its belief that the delivery method would 223 
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attract a pool of highly experienced DB teams to the project. MnDOT also felt that DB project 224 
delivery provided an equitable mechanism to divide the project’s total risk with the winning 225 
design-builder. For instance, MnDOT decided to assume the risk of acquiring all but two of the 226 
required permits, assigning the design-builder the responsibility for obtaining the National 227 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System and Coast Guard Navigation permits. This approach was 228 
successful in that MnDOT obtained all required permits within two weeks of the emergency. 229 
 230 
Procurement  231 
Based on its past experience, MnDOT had found that the use of alternative technical concepts 232 
(ATC) proposed by competing design-builders at confidential one-on-one meetings provided a 233 
potential to unlock the benefit of early contractor involvement in the procurement process and 234 
provide innovative solutions that were not contemplated in its RFP (Gransberg et al. 2013). ATCs 235 
are a procedure in which competitors propose options to the baseline design found DB Request for 236 
Proposals (RFP) (Carpenter 2010). The cornerstone of the MnDOT ATC process was termed 237 
Preapproved Elements (PAE). The PAE procurement process allowed competing design-builders 238 
to propose changes to the design found in the RFP via “private and confidential preproposal 239 
meetings,” with the following purpose: 240 
“Each Proposer is invited and encouraged to attend a private preproposal meeting at which the 241 
Department will address and respond to the Proposer’s concerns and questions regarding details 242 
of the project scope, administrative procedures, outstanding issues for the remainder of the bid 243 
process, and any other related matters. Each meeting would be private in that only one Proposer 244 
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would meet with MnDOT representatives at a time. Proposers are not required to accept the 245 
meeting invitation” (MnDOT 2010).  246 
 247 
MnDOT capped the number of ATCs that each competing DB team could submit. MnDOT’s 248 
purpose for limiting ATCs was driven by the desire to focus its process on high-value ATCs, as 249 
well as to eliminate the need to review and approve/disapprove ATCs of inconsequential value. 250 
After a design-builder had submitted an ATC, an expert panel, separate from the proposal 251 
evaluation team, scheduled a meeting with the team that had made the ATC proposal. “If the ATC 252 
was acceptable, it was approved and incorporated into the proposer’s scope of work as a PAE, 253 
permitting the proposer to include the ATC-turned-PAE in both its technical package and its price 254 
proposal” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012). Flatiron-Manson (FM), the eventual winning DB team, 255 
stated that “MnDOT did an excellent job in managing the procurement process. Of particular value 256 
...the one-on-one meetings [got] answers quickly, [and the] responsiveness saved time and effort 257 
in putting their [FM’s] proposal together” (Warne 2008). FM proposed PAEs that included an 258 
integral riding surface and novel method to demolish the existing foundation. 259 
 260 
The contractual definition of “best value” was cited as being critical the selection process. The 261 
competing design-builders indicated that the transparency of the evaluation plan with the details 262 
of the scoring criteria was brilliant. According to Warne (2008), FM felt the scoring process “sent 263 
a clear message that the state valued higher quality and not just price.” For instance, a 15-point 264 
bonus was offered for proposed designs that removed as many as six design exceptions, portraying 265 
MnDOT’s preference for building the project with no design exception approvals and the agency’s 266 
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willingness to compensate the competitors for demonstrating inventive design and construction 267 
concepts in their proposals. MnDOT also required three 30-minute individual confidential 268 
conference calls and two 2-hour face-to-face meetings per week with each competing team. The 269 
bottom-line is that MnDOT invested 27.5 hours per week during the 3-week proposal preparation 270 
period (Warne 2008). MnDOT also provided each of the five DB teams a weekly escorted site visit 271 
(Hietpas 2008). 272 
 273 
Because of the high level of interaction during proposal preparation, MnDOT was able to limit the 274 
final proposal to a maximum of 20 pages plus a 20-page appendix as opposed to normal page limits 275 
that run from 120 to 150 pages on routine DB proposals. The page limitation focused the 276 
competitors on those components of the project’s scope that were critical to its success. This is 277 
consistent with the latest complex mega-project management theory which requires agencies to 278 
“define a complex project’s critical success factors early in project development and use those to 279 
guide the remainder of the project development and delivery process” (Gransberg et al. 2013). The 280 
proposals were evaluated by a Technical Review Committee (TRC) consisting of four MnDOT 281 
engineers, representatives from the city of Minneapolis, a member of the Associated General 282 
Contractors, as prescribed by Minnesota law and two FHWA members that oversaw the selection 283 
process to make sure that it complied with federal requirements. 284 
 285 
In line with a study on managing complex mega-projects advocates “incentivizing the key 286 
elements of project success” (Shane et al. 2015), MnDOT offered two incentives for the critical 287 
project success factor: timely completion. The first incentive was a $7 million no-excuse bonus 288 
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for on-time completion provided the design-builder waived all future claims (Heitpas 2008). The 289 
second incentive was an early completion bonus of $2 million for every 10-day period the project 290 
was finished ahead of the contract completion date, capped at $20 million total maximum. MnDOT 291 
also integrated a disincentive of $200,000 per day for late completion. Both incentives were based 292 
on MnDOT’s estimated daily user cost of $400,000. 293 
 294 
The urgency of the situation drove MnDOT to complete the award of the contact as rapidly as 295 
practical, creating a short-term situation without sufficient “time to publish the results of the 296 
evaluation before contract award or to debrief unsuccessful offerors.  297 
THE PROTEST 298 
An award protest was asserted, “based primarily on the fact that the winning team also submitted 299 
the highest proposed price” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012). MnDOT’s rich base of DB experience 300 
had also provided it with a number of opportunities to defend the correctness and integrity of its 301 
DB evaluation and award process in both state and federal district courts. In each previous case, it 302 
relied on a defense described in a paper by Shane et al. (2006) as follows: 303 
•  “The evaluation plan was completely transparent.” 304 
•  “MnDOT followed it precisely.” 305 
•  “MnDOT could logically defend the final award decision.” 306 
It is not unusual for emergency procurement procedures to lead to objections. These types of 307 
objections range from mere public relations problems to the protest of an award and litigation. As 308 
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stated earlier in this paper, MnDOT procured a DB contractor using a best value selection process. 309 
Minnesota Statutes Section 161.3410, et seq. provides MnDOT with legislative authorization to 310 
use DB best value procurement if it publishes an RFP which includes a description of DB 311 
evaluation and selection criteria with each criterion’s weight in the final formula. The MnDOT 312 
award process calculates "best-value" scoring by dividing each offeror's price by its technical 313 
score, resulting in an award metric of “dollars per technical point,” which according to Koch et al. 314 
(2010) is termed an “adjusted price DB award algorithm.” MnDOT must award the contract to the 315 
responsive and responsible bidder with the lowest best value score.  316 
MnDOT’s first DB project, US 52 in Rochester, stimulated a protest of the method used to arrive 317 
at a short-list in the first phase of the 2-phase procurement (Shane et al. 2006). That protest turned 318 
on the issue of whether or not including a consideration of past DB experience was fair to local 319 
contractors on the state’s first DB project. The courts, while finding that the evaluation plan was 320 
not airtight, essentially ruled that MnDOT applied the same flawed criteria equally on all the 321 
competitors and dismissed the protest as being without merit (Shane et al. 2006). 322 
After the US 52 project and before the I-35W bridge project, MnDOT awarded 6 DB best value 323 
contracts without a legal challenge to the procurement process. However, the outcome of the 324 
process for the I-35W bridge forced MnDOT to once again defend itself against a protest of award 325 
(Hietpas 2008). A lawsuit was filed in October 2007 in Ramsey County District Court to obtain an 326 
injunction of all work and to rule the contract as illegal (Faegre et al. 2009). The suit made the 327 
following arguments to prove the illegality of the contract: 328 
•  MnDOT used improper evaluation criteria. 329 
•  MnDOT orally misled some of the bidders regarding permitted construction techniques.  330 
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•  The MnDOT TRC had abused its “discretion” by not awarding the contract to the proposal 331 
with the lowest proposed price and shortest proposed completion date (Faegre et al. 2009).  332 
The lawsuit was dismissed by the District Court and subsequently appealed to the Minnesota Court 333 
of Appeals which upheld the lower court’s dismissal as correct. Rather than describe the original 334 
court decision and the appellate court decision in chronological order, the facts and logic of each 335 
court with regard to the above three allegations will be combined into a separate discussion of each 336 
issue. It is hoped that this technique will allow the reader to better focus on the salient points of 337 
the case. 338 
 339 
Improper Evaluation Criteria 340 
The allegation contested the TRC determination that FM’s winning proposal was indeed 341 
responsive, thereby constituting improper evaluation criteria for two elements of the proposed 342 
design. The first was that MnDOT accepted FM’s proposal which included ROW outside the RFP 343 
project limits. The second involved a concrete-box design using two instead of the RFP-mandated 344 
three webs. The lower court did not specifically rule on the criteria themselves but instead focused 345 
on the timing of the suit itself. 346 
First, it noted that the suit was brought at a time when the project was nearly complete thus making 347 
it “no longer justiciable” and moot due to an inability to rectify the alleged injustice if the case was 348 
found for the plaintiffs. Since the Minnesota DB best value award statute specifically gives the 349 
TRC the authority to make responsiveness decisions, the court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to 350 
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establish any abuse of the express statutory discretion by the TRC, which was made moot by the 351 
plaintiffs’ failure to press the suit in a timely manner. 352 
The primary argument regarding the evaluation criteria made in the appeal was that 353 
“responsiveness under the design/build best value statute must be determined exactly like 354 
responsiveness is determined under traditional design-bid-build procurements” (Faegre et al. 355 
2009). The appeals court interpreted that argument to mean that the plaintiffs were asserting a 356 
“common-law definition of a responsive proposal” and alleging that the FM proposal “materially 357 
deviated from specifications.” The two alleged deviations were as follows: 358 
• “The proposed work for this project shall not include additional capacity or Right of Way.” 359 
• “That concrete-box designs feature a minimum of three webs.” (Faegre et al. 2009). 360 
The FM design proposal included two previously approved PAEs. The first provided for a 361 
temporary easement to allow FM to extend its operations outside the project limits shown in the 362 
RFP. FM agreed to obtain the necessary permission itself and did so. The easement was required 363 
to permit FM to optimize its proposed means and methods by staging the machinery necessary to 364 
erect the bridge on a parcel of land that was not included in the MnDOT ROW acquisition plan. 365 
The RFP also included a statement that permitted the design-builder to submit a written request to 366 
MnDOT “if additional ROW is required” The plaintiffs pointed out that the same section in the 367 
RFP also includes a passage stating: “Proposed work for this project shall not include additional 368 
capacity or Right of Way.” This is certainly a potential ambiguity. 369 
 370 
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The FHWA definition of an ATC is “a request by a proposer to modify a contract requirement, 371 
specifically for that proposer’s use in gaining competitive benefit during the bidding or proposal 372 
process… [and] must provide a solution that is equal to or better than the owner’s base design 373 
requirements in the invitation for bid (IFB for DBB) or request for proposal (RFP for DB) 374 
document.” (FHWA 2012). The essence of an ATC is to require “the agency to alter the baseline 375 
design and/or the baseline design criteria because if no deviation is required, the concept would be 376 
responsive if proposed as merely the given competitor’s preferred design approach” (Gransberg et 377 
al. 2013). Thus, the fact was that ATCs/PAEs were allowable and to qualify as an ATC, the 378 
proposed changes must literally be a deviation to the “baseline criteria”. The assertion that basing 379 
a proposal on an approved PAE, in FM’s case added ROW and a concrete-box design with only 380 
two webs, was ruled to be perfectly responsive despite the potential ambiguity. 381 
 382 
Misleading Oral Statements 383 
As previously noted, the MnDOT ATC process involves confidential one-on-one discussions with 384 
each competing proposer to iron out the details of ATC concepts and advance them to biddable 385 
PAEs. Thus, unlike DBB procurement where every communication between the agency and one 386 
of the competing contractors is publicized, DB procurements with ATCs are conducted in 387 
conditions of enforced secrecy to preserve each design-builder’s competitive edge (FHWA 2012). 388 
The ATC process has been integral to the MnDOT DB procurement since its inception in 2001. 389 
Therefore, the fact that MnDOT would convey different information to each contractor was well-390 
understood and known to be an established practice well before the 2007 I-35W bridge collapse 391 
(MnDOT 2008). The appeals court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the propriety of 392 
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the MnDOT ATC/PAE process citing the fact that the RFP imposed an “equivalent design 393 
requirement,” and a design analysis to show that any proposed concrete-box design meet or exceed 394 
the three web standard. Since FM’s concrete-box design exceeded this minimum equivalent design 395 
criterion, the appeal court rejected the “misleading oral statements” assertion. 396 
 397 
TRC Discretion to Determine Responsiveness 398 
The District Court determined that the statute invested the TRC with the responsibility to make 399 
responsiveness determinations. The appeals court went on to cite the fact that the Minnesota state 400 
best value statute (Minn. Stat §161.3426, subds. 1(a)) expressly grants authority to the TRC to 401 
reject proposals that it finds to be nonresponsive. The court also opined that DB procurements, “by 402 
definition, are not based on fully detailed specifications.” The court concluded that those two 403 
factors defined the intent of the law "to permit the TRC, by applying its judgment based on the 404 
advertised selection criteria, to evaluate proposals where no finished design exists to which the 405 
proposals must conform" (Faegre et al. 2009). In a nutshell, the court determined that "the TRC 406 
has discretion in deciding whether a proposal is responsive." It also noted that the TRC's discretion 407 
is not unconstrained and responsiveness determinations must be supported by the weight of the 408 
evidence. Hence, the appeal was unsuccessful, and the Court of Appeals determined that there was 409 
“no error of law and that substantial evidence supported the TRC's determination that Flatiron's 410 
proposal was responsive, leading the court to conclude that dismissal of the lawsuit was proper" 411 
(Faegre et al. 2009). 412 
Summary of Protest Results 413 
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As in the US 52 protest on its initial DB project, MnDOT relied on its alternative procurement 414 
philosophy to keep every aspect of the procurement’s advertisement, evaluation, and award as 415 
open to the competing design-builders as time and circumstances would allow. The intense amount 416 
of one-on-one interaction associated with this project is unprecedented and amply demonstrates 417 
the agency’s willingness to take risks that are commensurate with needs of the emergency 418 
situation. The principles of complex project management demand that decisions be made as early 419 
as possible in the project development process (Gransberg et al. 2013). To mitigate the risks 420 
inherent with those decisions on emergency complex mega-projects like the I-35W Bridge, 421 
demands early contractor involvement in the planning and design process. MnDOT achieved that 422 
via the information rich communications it maintained throughout the proposal preparation phase. 423 
Notwithstanding the confidentiality of the ATC/PAE process, MnDOT had a totally transparent 424 
evaluation plan/award algorithm that allowed them to withstand the protest. More importantly, it 425 
delivered a technically, environmentally, and politically complex mega-project in record time. The 426 
I-35W Bridge collapsed on August 1st, 2007 and was reopened on September 18th, 2008, more 427 
than three months early. Table 2 contains the timeline for the expedited procurement. 428 
Table 2. I-35W Bridge Replacement Timeline (Gransberg and Loulakis 2013). 429 
Date  Event  Remark 
August 1, 2007 Bridge collapses None
August 2, 2007 MnDOT decides to use DB project 
delivery 
None 
August 4, 2007 RFQ issued None
August 8, 2007 Statement of qualifications received 
from competitors
None 
August 8, 2007 Short list published Same day as receipt
August 23, 2007 RFP released None
September 15, 2007 Proposals submitted None
September 19, 2007 Design-builder selected 49 days to select contractor 
October 8, 2007 Notice to proceed None
September 19, 2008 Project opened to traffic 339 days after start of 
construction
 430 
 431 
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 432 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 433 
Completing the I-35W Bridge replacement project 339 days is a noteworthy achievement by both 434 
the MnDOT and FM, its design-builder. The process developed to restore services amply 435 
demonstrates the value for money to the public from those innovations used. That MnDOT had to 436 
defend its process from a protest on this emergency mega-project further testifies to the efficacy 437 
of it model for emergency procurement of major infrastructure projects.  438 
 439 
MnDOT used the following tools to successfully expedite the emergency replacement of the I-440 
35W Bridge which may prove useful to others with a need to complete an emergency restoration 441 
of services project. 442 
• “Used two-step right-of-way acquisition with right of entry easements to provide immediate 443 
access to the construction site followed by a guaranteed timeline for financial closure on each 444 
parcel;” 445 
• “Obtained single points of contact within each resource agency for all permit communication 446 
and a commitment to expedite the issuance of project permits;” 447 
• “Kept tight control of project scope to avoid unintentional delays as the result of exceeding 448 
permit constraints;” 449 
• “Encouraged a highly interactive preproposal period, including regularly scheduled one-on-450 
one meetings with each competitor, whose contents were kept confidential;” 451 
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• “Accepted confidential ATC/PAEs prior to proposal submission for review and decision;” 452 
• “Created a completely transparent evaluation plan and award algorithm that withstood a 453 
protest; and” 454 
• “Developed incentives that were directly related to the preeminent project success factor, 455 
timely completion.” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012). 456 
 457 
Limitations  458 
The study reported in this paper has found that the MnDOT successfully defended itself against an 459 
award protest. This conclusion is only applicable to this particular project and this particular 460 
agency and cannot be generalized to other projects or agencies. However, it does provide a proven 461 
model for emergency procurement of major infrastructure projects. 462 
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